|09STATE96550||2009-09-17 11:11||2010-11-28 18:06||SECRET||Secretary of State|
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 096550 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2014 TAGS: EZ MARR PREL SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: POTUS EUROPEAN-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION (CORRECTED COPY OF STATE 96519) REF: STATE 96526 Classified By: T U/S Ellen O. Tauscher for Reasons 1.4 a,b,and d. ¶1. (U) (THIS CORRECTED COPY PROPERLY REFERENCES STATE 96526.) This is an ACTION REQUEST. Please see paragraph 3. ALL MATERIALS IN THIS CABLE ARE TO BE EMBARGOED FROM DELIVERY TO HOST GOVERNMENTS UNTIL 25 MINUTES PRIOR TO A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT RELEASED ON SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 AT 9:55 A.M. (EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME - WASHINGTON, D.C.). ¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The White House is expected to announce a Presidential decision at approximately 9:55 a.m.(Washington, D.C.) on September 17 regarding a U.S. European-based BMD adaptive regional architecture, which is significantly different from the Bush Administration's plan to deploy 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a BMD tracking radar in the Czech Republic. END BACKGROUND. ¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Addressee Posts are instructed to deliver the talking points to Host Governments in paragraph 4 on Thursday, September 17, as a non-paper, but no earlier than 9:30 a.m. (Easter Daylight Time - Washington, D.C.). USNATO, Embassies in NATO Capitals (except for Embassies Warsaw and Prague), Embassy Tokyo, Embassy Moscow, and Embassies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) are instructed also to deliver the tailored talking points for NATO, Japan, Russia, and the GCC States in paragraphs 5-8. Action Request addressees should attempt to provide pre-notifications immediately prior to the public announcement of the Presidential decision but not before 9:30 a.m. EDT; with the different time zones involved, Washington recognizes that some notifications may not occur until after the White House public announcement. Posts may draw upon the Questions and Answers to be provided reftel for use with Host Governments on an "if asked" basis, or as Posts determine is appropriate. The Questions and Answers in reftel may be drawn upon by Posts but should not/not be handed over to Host Governments. Materials for public diplomacy (e.g., Fact Sheet, Questions and Answers, and POTUS Statement) will be provided to Posts septel. Posts please notify the Department regarding date of delivery, recipients, and reaction, if any. END ACTION REQUEST. ¶4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS: U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY - EUROPEAN DECISION - The White House announced that the President has approved Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's unanimous recommendation for improved missile defenses in Europe against the threat from Iran to our forces and families deployed to the region and to our Allies. - Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can threaten its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey, and the Caucasus and it is actively developing and testing ballistic missiles that can reach more and more of Europe. -- Our concern regarding Iranian missile capabilities is further increased by the fact that our Intelligence Community continues to assess that Iran, at a minimum, is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. - The new "Phased, Adaptive Approach" recommended by Secretary Gates updates and revises the previous program for missile defense in Europe based on two key findings of the DoD review: -- First, the threat from Iran's regional ballistic missiles has developed more rapidly than previously expected. At the same time, the threat from potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been slower to develop than we STATE 00096550 002 OF 006 previously expected. -- Second, our missile defense capabilities and technologies have advanced significantly. Improved interceptor capabilities, such as the currently deployed Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and advanced variants that are already in development, permit a more flexible and capable architecture. - Therefore, the President has approved a Phased, Adaptive Approach that is responsive to the current threat, but also can incorporate new technologies quickly and cost-effectively to adapt as the threat and our technologies continue to change. It will unfold in phases: -- The first phase will speed protection of U.S. deployed forces, civilians, and families and our Allies in Europe against the current threat from Iran by deploying proven systems by 2011 ) about six or seven years earlier than the previous program. -- Subsequent phases will add advanced variant sea- and land-based versions of the SM-3 and cover additional territory in Europe should the Iranian threat expand. -- In the fourth and final phase we will anticipate augmenting our existing capabilities to defend the United States against potential advances in Iran's ICBM capability with advanced versions of the SM-3. This would be a similar capability to that provided in the program of record. - This improved approach removes the need for a Ground Based Interceptor field in Poland and features a distributed interceptor and sensor architecture that does not require the single large, fixed radar originally planned to be located in the Czech Republic. -- Under the new approach, land- and sea-based missile defense interceptors and sensors offer some flexibility to be redeployed as the regional ballistic missile threat dictates. This distributed network approach also will increase the survivability of the system and provide more opportunities for collaboration with Allies and partners. -- We are beginning consultations with Poland, the Czech Republic, and other Allies on the new approach, and will work with our NATO Allies on determining locations for the sensors and interceptors, and on integrating the Phased, Adaptive Approach with their missile defense capabilities and with the emerging NATO command and control network. - Strong missile defenses will strengthen our efforts to find a solution that brings Iran into compliance with its international obligations: the more we can diminish the coercive value of Iran's missiles, the less Iran stands to gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing capabilities. - This set of recommendations comes from an ongoing Congressionally-mandated review that is taking a comprehensive examination of our global approach to missile defense and is consistent with the Defense Department's budget choices for fiscal year 2010: -- For example, we added additional funding to field more systems such as Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors. END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS. ¶5. (S/REL NATO) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR USNATO AND EMBASSIES IN NATO CAPITALS (TALKING POINTS BELOW SHOULD BE USED FOR ALL NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT FOR POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC; WARSAW AND PRAGUE WILL RECEIVE SEPARATE TAILORED TALKING POINTS TO BE DELIVERED ON SEPTEMBER 17 BY THE FLOURNOY-TAUSCHER DELEGATION): GENERAL - NATO leaders have all agreed that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory, and populations. - As a result, NATO has noted the significant contribution to Alliance security by those Allies who possess, or are STATE 00096550 003 OF 006 acquiring, missile defense capabilities. - At the 2008 Summit, NATO leaders agreed to consider options for a NATO missile defense system that would cover all remaining areas of Allied populations and territory. To date, those efforts have focused on missile defense systems to protect deployed forces from shorter-range ballistic missile threats. - At the 2009 NATO summit, Heads of State and Government tasked experts to examine the potential expansion of the ALTBMD program ) which is designed to be the command and control "backbone" for theater missile defense for deployed forces. - The United States now proposes a "Phased Adaptive Approach," which will reinforce and strengthen on-going NATO efforts. Specifically, we believe that the Phased Adaptive Approach is fully supportive of the decision to pursue options for a complementary NATO-wide multi-layered BMD architecture, which currently is envisioned to use NATO's command and control backbone architecture. This is a flexible and cost-effective approach that leverages proven technologies against a known threat. - Most importantly, the Phased Adaptive Approach is designed to work in concert with Allied efforts to provide protection against ballistic missile attack for all NATO Allies, reflecting the Alliance principle of indivisibility of security. - The Phased Adaptive Approach will provide our most proven and operational missile defense capabilities in the near-term, defending Allied territory sooner against the current Iranian threat. - U.S. missile defense efforts will of course be fully interoperable with those of NATO. - We propose that -- subsequent to Alliance discussions and follow-on briefings in greater detail -- the Alliance examine how we can integrate the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach with NATO missile defense. This can be discussed further at the upcoming defense ministerial in Bratislava. - The Phased Adaptive Approach would serve to greatly strengthen NATO's missile defense capabilities in the face of a growing threat to Alliance security. - We look forward to engaging the Alliance in political and technical discussions in the weeks ahead. FINANCING (if raised) - We will work closely with Allies to examine broader resourcing requirements for defense of Allied forces, territories and populations, including the integration of our Phased Adaptive Approach. ROLE FOR NATO MEMBERS - We have already consulted with the two Allies that had agreed to host missile defense assets under the previous plan. I want to reiterate that we are deeply appreciative of their readiness to take difficult political decisions to respond to the need to better protect allied territories and populations against the threat of ballistic missiles. - We intend to engage in active consultations at NATO on the best way forward. - The "Phased Adaptive Approach" is flexible and could be integrated into a NATO territorial missile defense system. There will be a requirement for Allies to host the sensors and interceptors to be included in the Phased Adaptive Approach. There are many possibilities, and we look forward to continuing our NATO consultations. - If pressed: At this time, I would prefer not to get into STATE 00096550 004 OF 006 specific issues related to potential Host Nations. We have many options in this flexible architecture ) sea- and land-based, northern and southern Europe. We intend to engage soon at NATO with Allies on those questions. - We expect that Allied national systems or current NATO systems will be able to integrate well with the overall phased approach. - Allied contributions can be interoperable with the Phased Approach missile defense architecture to ensure they form a cost-effective and comprehensive architecture. GROUND BASED INTERCEPTORS - If needed: The U.S. will continue to develop the GBI technology for CONUS defense because domestically it remains a cost-effective option. However, we have no plans to pursue GBIs in Europe given the promise and track record of SM-3 technology. END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR NATO. ¶6. (C/REL RUSSIA) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR RUSSIA: - The President's missile defense in Europe decision will publicly be announced at 10:00 a.m. Washington, D.C. time. The National Security Advisor, General Jones, will be delivering a similar message to Ambassador Kislyak before the announcement. - The decision is the result of a long review process; new information on the Iranian ballistic missile program drove the decision. - Iran has made more progress on short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles, and less progress on ICBMs than anticipated. Now the threat is greater to the Middle East and to Europe, with a less immediate threat to the United States. - We do not plan to deploy GBIs in Poland and we will not base the European Mid-Course radar in the Czech Republic. Instead, there will be an adaptive, phased approach. - We believe that Iran plans to deploy hundreds of these short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. Our old plan was designed to intercept only small numbers of ICBMs. - There is no doubt that Iran is developing these missiles to arm them with a nuclear warhead. There is NO OTHER REASON to spend so much time and effort into developing these missiles. They are not useful weapons if only armed with a conventional warhead. - The new plan for European missile defense is better designed to protect Europe from this Iranian threat that is emerging. We intend to deploy the SM-3 interceptor which is what we are deploying in the Middle East as well. SM-3s do not have the capability to threaten Russian ICBMs. - In the first stages of deployment, we also are seeking to place these interceptors closer to Iran (from what I understand, this is exactly the idea that President Putin proposed to President Bush during their July 2007 meeting at Kennebunkport, Maine). - The new plan calls for radars and detection systems to be deployed closer to Iran. These radars will not have the capacity to track Russian ICBMs. - With this decision behind us, we now want to move aggressively to launch serious cooperation on missile defense with Russia. - As the President said during his meeting with President Medvedev in April, we want to begin by standing up the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). The hope is to share data from our respective early-warning systems. STATE 00096550 005 OF 006 END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR RUSSIA. ¶7. (C/REL JAPAN) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR JAPAN: - The U.S. greatly appreciates Japan's partnership in BMD; we remain deeply committed to strengthening regional BMD capabilities including operational cooperation, joint research, and co-development. - Recent North Korean provocations serve as a reminder of the importance of our cooperative missile defense efforts, which help underpin a strong U.S.-Japan Alliance and contribute to regional stability. - We remain committed to an effective defense of the U.S. and our Allies against rogue ballistic missile threats, including North Korea and, if it continues down its current path, Iran. - As you are aware, the BMD Review has undertaken a comprehensive examination of our approach to missile defenses, including an in-depth look at our approach to European missile defense and in other regions around the world. -- USG discussions with the MOD and MOFA over the last several months made clear that you have particular interest in the European missile defense analysis -- we understand these strategic decisions have an impact in the Asia-Pacific region and want to make sure you are fully informed of our results. -- Throughout the review process the U.S. recognized and factored in Japanese concerns/equities especially those related to our on-going discussions with the Russian Federation. - Although the BMD Review report is not due to Congress until this January, we have already reached some important conclusions. We have decided to move forward with discussing results now so we do not delay deploying improved defenses for ourselves or our allies. OTHER CONSULTATIONS - We would like to explain the President's decision to you before our public announcement and before we speak with Russia. We are discussing this new European approach with Poland, the Czech Republic, and NATO, as we speak. -- As a close and trusted ally, we consider it important to share this information with you. However, in light of past problems with information security, we must insist that you take every precaution to ensure that this information will not be leaked. Any leaks would have significant implications for our European missile defense approach, and would be damaging to our bilateral relationship. Should there be a security breach elsewhere, it is important that our governments not officially confirm leaked information if it appears in the media before official release by the U.S. Government. THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH - As you have seen, the new plan for European missile defense will use the SM-3 interceptor, both land- and sea-based, rather than GBIs included in the previous program. - In many ways, your leadership and partnership in the development of the SM-3 and in operational coordination have been critical to our development of this new approach to Europe. Just as we have cooperatively deployed proven and transportable missile defenses to help defend against ballistic missile threats in the Asia-Pacific region, we will deploy those same technologies and capabilities in Europe. - At this time, the new European approach is based on U.S.-owned SM-3s. However, we will want to look at future missile defense opportunities with NATO and our European STATE 00096550 006 OF 006 allies that could include potential sales of a number of missile defense capabilities. We would very much like to work with Japan to make strategic decisions about whether and how our jointly developed missile (i.e., the SM-3 Block IIA) could be part of that future, and perhaps part of a future networked global system of regional missile defense architectures. - We look forward to continuing our strong partnership on missile defense and growing our cooperative activities. BMD FOR JAPAN AND EAST ASIA - As mentioned previously, the phased approach in Europe is in many ways similar to the approach we have taken with you. We believe that our current approach in the Asia- Pacific region is sound and forms a model that we can draw upon elsewhere. Naturally, we will re-engage with you soon on the full findings of our BMD Review. IF ASKED ABOUT BURDEN SHARING AT NATO: - As you well know, this type of approach creates opportunities for participation ) for example, in command and control, sensors, and interceptors ) and enhanced cooperation, similar to the type that we already enjoy. We look forward to engaging with NATO soon about how our new approach contributes to common defenses and how we can share responsibilities in that effort. END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR JAPAN. ¶8. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES (BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES): - The USG has adopted a phased adaptive approach for the ballistic missile defense (BMD) of Europe. The approach in Europe complements the emerging BMD architecture in the Gulf, which is currently defending against potential Iranian air and missile threats to our partners and U.S. forces in the Gulf region. -- We are working to optimize limited assets to ensure that programs in Europe will not be executed at the expense of our friends and commitment to the defense of the Gulf Cooperation Council. -- BMD programs in Europe will not require a diversion of U.S. assets from the Gulf. - The United States has deployed BMD systems to the Middle East to protect against the Iranian missile threat, including AEGIS BMD presence in the Persian Gulf and two PATRIOT batteries each in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. -- These U.S. systems complement the indigenous BMD systems in the region including PAC-II capability in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and Shared Early Warning capability with the UAE. -- The USG is exploring the possibility of providing additional BMD coverage to Gulf Cooperation Council nations if the circumstances warrant. -- The USG will continue to work with its Gulf partners to develop regional, integrated air and missile defense systems. END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR GCC STATES. CLINTON
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